Pak is a terrorist country: LeT man

[candypreet]

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/1119516.cms

WASHINGTON: A Pakistani detainee in Guantanamo Bay has exposed Islamabad's official sponsorship of terrorism in depositions before a US tribunal
The unnamed prisoner, accused of being a member of the Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, has referred to the fighting in Kashmir and said it was backed by Pakistan, the US' frontline ally in the war on terrorism.

"If you consider this organization a terrorist organization, then you should consider the Pakistan government a terrorist country," he says in a deposition obtained by the Associated Press wire service under a Freedom of Information lawsuit.

The excerpt comes from nearly 2,000 pages of documents representing some 558 tribunals held in Guantanamo Bay, according to AP.

The detainee's testimony implicating Islamabad is important because Lashkar is one of several Pakistani organisations designated by the US State Department as Foreign Terrorist Organisations (FTOs) and its sponsors are subject to action under the UN Security Council Resolution No.1373 against terrorism.

Although the intelligence community in India and the US believe organisations such as Lashkar and Jaish-e-Mohammed were officially sponsored by Pakistan, Islamabad has maintained a degree of deniability. Islamabad's policy in the regard is common knowledge in Pakistan and has frequently been reported in the Pakistani media.

AP's effort has also brought to light other confusions and contradictions in the US war on terror, revealed through the Gitmo depositions.

Among the detainees in Guantanamo Bay identified in the AP report are an Afghan chicken farmer accused of being a Taliban, a goatherd who was captured near a mined area when he was looking for his goats, and a Saudi fruit merchant visiting Pakistan.
One 25-year-old prisoner testifies that not only wasn't he an enemy combatant, but he was a bodyguard for Afghanistan's US-backed President Hamid Karzai, currently on a visit to Washington. He says his military training came by "order of American officers." It is not clear why he was detained.
One of the most arresting testimonies reported by AP revolves around Feroz Abbasi, a Briton accused of training at an al-Qaeda camp and meeting bin Laden, who has subsequently been released without charges.

Abbasi began his testimony by quoting Malcolm X, the slain black Muslim leader: "I did not come here to condemn America. I came here to tell the truth and if the truth condemns American then she stands condemned."

Later Abbasi was kicked out of the proceedings for engaging in a heated debate about international law with the tribunal president, who snaps, "I don't care about international law. I don't want to hear the words international law again."

[candypreet]

BLACKWILL
J&K issue will remain till Pak accepts LoC as border: Blackwill
WASHINGTON, MAY 24 (PTI)
The Kashmir issue will go on for a "very long time" unless and until Pakistan reconciles itself to accepting the LoC as the border, former US Ambassador to India Robert D. Blackwill has said.

"Unless and until Pakistan reconciles itself to accepting the Line of Control as the border, the Kashmir dispute will go on for a very long time and cross-border terrorist violence from Pakistan against India would resume," Blackwill, also a former Strategic Adviser to US President George W Bush in the National Security Council, said.

"Pakistan will not succeed in Kashmir," he said writing in "The National Interest," a leading American quarterly.

The former envoy said for more than fifty years, young cadets, including Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf himself, have been taught in Pakistan's military academies that their "holy mission" was the "liberation" of all of Kashmir and that the central purpose of Pakistan itelf was to further this task

"Beginning in 1947, Pakistan's attempts to accomplish this directly by military force have failed. Thus thwarted, in the past decade and a half, Pakistan has used terror as an instrument of attempted change in Jammu and Kashmir. This too has not succeeded," Blackwill wrote.

When faced with such a fruitless strategy, a government has three choices: It can stick with the losing strategy, develop a new strategy or change objectives. "In my judgement, Pakistan has not yet made a strategic shift away from its long-time policies of territorial acquisition and cross-border terrorism," he said.
http://www.outlookindia.com/pti_news.asp?id=300048

[candypreet]

Musharraf must shut terror camps in Pak's interest: Daily Times
Lahore: A leading Pakistani daily has said that the Musharraf regime must sincerely look at its policy on terrorist camps in its territory from its own perspective.

The Daily Times, in an editorial, “The various 'camps' in Pakistan” said that ignoring the presence of jihadi camps in Pakistan would be like ignoring a reality, despite the fact that their presence more than hurting India or Afghanistan, hurt the sovereignty of Pakistan.

“By being in denial we may actually be ignoring a very significant aspect of reality in Pakistan. Just as the elected Prime Ministers during the 1990s were unable to control their Kashmir policy in the face of the jihadi warlords, President Musharraf too may have already reached the limit of his operative control of Pakistan in the presence of these 'camps',” the editorial said.

“Thus Pakistan has to come out of this “mercenary” syndrome and learn to be master of its own policies. The camps - jihadi, Taliban, Al Qaeda - must all go in the interest of the people of Pakistan. The cost of retaining them is prohibitive,” it said.

It said that though Pakistan always denied the presence of terrorist camps in Pakistan, there were reports that training could have restarted in some camps across Pakistan. The situation in Pakistan and in provinces like Balochistan, was a clear pointer to the fact that terrorist elements were present in Pakistan, the paper said.

The fact that US President George W Bush said on Saturday that during his trip to Pakistan, he would talk about “the terrorist activities and the need to dismantle training camps and to protect innocent life”, was an indication that such camps did exist in Pakistan.

Reports of Afghan President Hamid Karzai sharing intelligence with Pakistan that Mullah Mohammed Omar, the leader of the ousted Taliban militia and his key associates were hiding in Pakistan, also ought to be seen in the same context, it said.

Afghanistan, the paper said, had allegedly provided information about “the location of terrorist training camps along the border and in Pakistani cities”, adding that President Karzai also apparently handed over a list of wanted Afghan men to Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf and asked for their repatriation to Afghanistan.

“It is virtually impossible for the government to say with certainty that the Taliban are not “present and training”. The Afghans say Mullah Omar could be anywhere in Pakistan; they have no proof of his location. Pakistan is not a small country. Large parts of it are outside the jurisdiction of the state, just like warlord-controlled Afghanistan. President Karzai has asked Islamabad to close down terrorist camps,” it said.

Equally conspicuous was the presence of jihadis in relief operations in the wake of the October 8 earthquake in Pakistan occupied Kashmir and NWFP, the paper said.

“If Pakistan has a credibility problem, it is linked to the jihadi leaders still operating in Pakistan with renamed militias. The world interprets their presence in civil society as the retention of the “jihadi option” by President Musharraf in the event that the world is unable to persuade India to settle the Kashmir dispute. Certainly, in Azad Kashmir (PoK) and the NWFP not long ago, the world was witness to jihadis busy in the work of rescue and rehabilitation, spending colossal amounts of money in the areas where they have always been known to have training camps,” it added.

“Indeed, a youth on trial in the United States actually confessed last year that he had received “training” recently in a camp run by a jihadi warlord now living safely in Islamabad. In fact, the biggest jihadi warlord of all - with clear links to Kunar in Afghanistan where the Arabs lived during the Taliban rule - is in Lahore publishing his defiant anti-Musharraf message in the Urdu press on a daily basis. And if the Bajaur incident is any indicator, there could be many more “loopholes” in the jurisdictional control of the government in Pakistan than most people realise. Therefore the “camps” are still Pakistan's number one problem with the international community,” it further said.
http://www.newkerala.com/news2.php?action=fullnews&id=17117

[candypreet]

Monday, February 27, 2006

EDITORIAL: The various ‘camps’ in Pakistan

Talking to Doordarshan, the state-run Indian TV channel, President George Bush said on Saturday that on his trip to Pakistan he would talk about “the terrorist activities, the need to dismantle training camps and to protect innocent life”. The question put to him was specifically about the Azad Kashmir ‘training camps’. The same day there was news from Kabul that President Hamid Karzai had shared intelligence with Pakistan indicating that Mullah Mohammed Omar, leader of the Taliban regime, and his key associates were hiding in Pakistan. Afghanistan also allegedly provided information about “the location of terrorist training camps along the border and in Pakistani cities”. The Afghan president also claims to have handed over a list of wanted Afghan men to President Pervez Musharraf and asked for their repatriation to Afghanistan.

Pakistan denies that there are terrorist camps of any kind on Pakistani territory. But there have been sporadic reports in 2005 that “training” could have restarted. In Balochistan, it is virtually impossible for the government to say with certainty that the Taliban are not “present and training”. President Karzai should know this as he was ensconced there before he was taken out and sent to Afghanistan to head the new post-9/11 government. Pakistan too has accused Afghanistan of colluding with India to send weapons to Balochistan, with Kabul vehemently denying it. The situation could be out of the hands of both parties. No one sitting in Kabul can say that weapons are not going across to the “farari” camps in Balochistan.

The Afghans say Mullah Omar could be anywhere in Pakistan; they have no proof of his location. Pakistan is not a small country. Large parts of it are outside the jurisdiction of the state, just like warlord-controlled Afghanistan. President Karzai has asked Islamabad to close down terrorist camps, but has he given documentary proof of where these are located? For that matter, Pakistan is supposed to have told President Karzai that Indian consulates in Afghanistan were sending weapons to Balochistan. But where is the proof? Interestingly there were front-page reports in the Pakistani press that Islamabad had actually done that and that President Karzai had denied involvement despite documentary proof. But then, talking to AAJ TV on February 21, 2006, the interior minister, Aftab Khan Sherpao, stated clearly that he was present at the Musharraf-Karzai meeting and saw no documentary proof being given to the other side about Indian involvement in Balochistan!

If Pakistan has a credibility problem, it is linked to the jihadi leaders still operating in Pakistan with renamed militias. The world interprets their presence in civil society as the retention of the “jihadi option” by President Musharraf in the event that the world is unable to persuade India to settle the Kashmir dispute. Certainly, in Azad Kashmir and the NWFP not long ago, the world was witness to jihadis busy in the work of rescue and rehabilitation, spending colossal amounts of money in the areas where they have always been known to have training camps. Indeed, a youth on trial in the United States actually confessed last year that he had received “training” recently in a camp run by a jihadi warlord now living safely in Islamabad. In fact, the biggest jihadi warlord of all — with clear links to Kunar in Afghanistan where the Arabs lived during the Taliban rule — is in Lahore publishing his defiant anti-Musharraf message in the Urdu press on a daily basis. And if the Bajaur incident is any indicator, there could be many more “loopholes” in the jurisdictional control of the government in Pakistan than most people realise. Therefore the “camps” are still Pakistan’s number one problem with the international community.

Presidents Bush and Karzai may look to their own interests, but Pakistan should review the policy on “camps” from its own perspective. There is no arguing against the fact that the jihadi camps hurt the state sovereignty of Pakistan more than they hurt either India or the new order in Afghanistan. By being in denial we may actually be ignoring a very significant aspect of reality in Pakistan. Just as the elected prime ministers during the 1990s were unable to control their Kashmir policy in the face of the jihadi warlords, President Musharraf too may have already reached the limit of his operative control of Pakistan in the presence of these “camps”. Thus Pakistan has to come out of this “mercenary” syndrome and learn to be master of its own policies. The camps — jihadi, Taliban, Al Qaeda — must all go in the interest of the people of Pakistan. The cost of retaining them is prohibitive. *

Religious war in Bara

The NWFP governor has finally decided to launch an operation in Bara, in the Khyber Agency, to put an end to a year-old religious war, waged through illegal radio stations by two “mullahs” intent on ruling the tribes there. The tribesmen are in the thrall of the traditional Pir Saif ur Rehman while the dominant and powerful Qambarkhel tribe is with the challenger Mufti Naeem Shakir. Both came to Bara from outside, established their constituencies and began preaching. Because of their clashing beliefs a war of words soon began between the two. The Pir, an old Afghan refugee, was traditional “low church”; the Mufti was “high church” radical-orthodox. Both got their radio stations going and started spreading hatred.

The two troublemakers were asked by the “authorities” to leave but both defied the order. Typically, the government stepped back, hoping that the trouble would go away by itself. A big jirga was called but its verdict too was useless, proving that the institution that most city-dwelling Pushtuns prefer to municipal law is in fact quite irrelevant, as we have seen in South Waziristan. Not surprisingly, the Mufti then threatened the Pir with a suicide attack. Now the governor wants to get into the act, but things could already be a bit out of control. Mufti Naeem Shakir is reported to have gone beyond Bara and enlisted the allegiance of the powerful Zakhakhel tribe of Landi Kotal. After this it is going to be really hard to get him out of the area. The local clerics are already growling in Peshawar. The governor faces an escalating situation because early action was not taken. *

http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2006%5C02%5C27%5Cstory_27-2-2006_pg3_1

[candypreet]

this is a must see

http://www.kashmiri-pandit.org/elibrary/pakrole/experts.html

[sidthereal]

The site would be rejected on grounds of being Biased. But good links within the site.

[truthbtold]

Good job Candy, I appreciate all your efforts and the great information you put out for us! As I have said before Pakistan and Saudi are the dark lords of radical islam and terrorism, they smile in our face all the while stabbing us in the back. As you are well aware of! I have faith that these two countries are being dealt with in a different manner than Iran, Syria, Iraq, etc. Hopefully I'm not wrong for your countrys sake and mine.

[candypreet]

Good job Candy, I appreciate all your efforts and the great information you put out for us! As I have said before Pakistan and Saudi are the dark lords of radical islam and terrorism, they smile in our face all the while stabbing us in the back. As you are well aware of! I have faith that these two countries are being dealt with in a different manner than Iran, Syria, Iraq, etc. Hopefully I'm not wrong for your countrys sake and mine.
thanks. I do share the same feelings. and mot just our two countries, but the world in general

[sidthereal]

Good job Candy, I appreciate all your efforts and the great information you put out for us! As I have said before Pakistan and Saudi are the dark lords of radical islam and terrorism, they smile in our face all the while stabbing us in the back. As you are well aware of! I have faith that these two countries are being dealt with in a different manner than Iran, Syria, Iraq, etc. Hopefully I'm not wrong for your countrys sake and mine.
Well Said TBT, Pakistan indeed needs a different treatment. And it is well known it wont, as long as the US backs it.

[candypreet]

Analysis: Inside Pakistan
By ALEXIS DEBAT
The National Interest Online
WASHINGTON, Sept. 14 (UPI) -- And the West keeps venturing east, dragging with her fantasies of barbaric splendor. Only now in Pakistan, the West's post-Colonial thrill ride is limited to excited glances from behind high walls and security perimeters.

The first thing you notice about your wanly furnished room at Karachi's Sheraton hotel--one of the two where Westerners dare to stay in this port city--is the floor to ceiling fencing of the balcony. "It's to prevent people from throwing grenades", says the hotel security chief. Right. Colorful Karachi.

Washington opinion-makers, laboring hard in the past few weeks try to convince us that al-Qaida is now simply a label or ideology, would be tempted to give the man a corrective shake. But in Karachi--as in Islamabad, Lahore, Peshawar, Chitral or Miranshah--one thing remains venomously clear: l-Qaida is alive. It breathes and even thrives in Pakistan, not as a "label" but as a coherent entity--albeit in the form of a complex conglomerate of networks. Worse, it has laid deep roots in Pakistani society through which it has been able to expand, raise funds, plot and communicate. And while it does not operate with complete freedom, it has developed an extraordinary capability to maneuver from within the society, either by "hiding in plain sight" or using local networks, political parties and militant groups, with which it has built strong links since the 1980s.

According to extensive interviews with officials from the Inter Service Intelligence (ISI) and other government sources, al-Qaida's commanders operate largely from within Pakistan. Even if both Pakistani and U.S. intelligence sources still admit that Osama bin Laden's trail has gone almost "completely cold" since the CIA last spotted him in South Waziristan in 2003, senior ISI sources confirm that he continues to hide between the Chitral area in Pakistan and Nuristan in Afghanistan and that, according to information developed recently, he "does not move around much."

A lot more has been gleaned about the whereabouts of Ayman al-Zawahiri, who narrowly escaped a U.S. strike in the village of Damadola, in Pakistan's Bajaur tribal agency, last January. al-Qaida's number two travels within forty square kilometers of the same remote border area, and moves between Pakistan and Afghanistan's Kunar province. In Pakistan, Zawahiri enjoys the protection of several hundred members of Bajaur's Mamoond tribe, in which he has married, as well as the followers and recruits of two senior local clerics: Maulvi Faqir Muhammad and Maulvi Liaqat, both on Pakistan's "most wanted list."

On the run in Pakistan, Bin Laden and Zawahiri increasingly rely on a large, informal infrastructure of tens of thousands of Pakistani militants--from sectarian and Kashmiri organizations (such as Lashkar e Jhangvi, Harakat ul Mujahideen, Harakat ul Jihad ul Islami, and Jaish e Muhammad)--to survive, travel, communicate, operate. First forged during the Afghan jihad of the 1980s, these relationships were institutionalized in the late 1990s when al-Qaida welcomed, trained and catalogued tens of thousands of Pakistani militants in Afghanistan. This Pakistani muscle helped defend the Taliban regime against the Northern Alliance offensive in the Fall of 2001, but, like al-Qaida, was forced out of the country.

From the Daniel Pearl assassination in 2002 to the 2005 attacks in London to the bombing near the U.S. consulate in Pakistan last March (which killed one American diplomat), al-Qaida extensively capitalizes on its Pakistani networks. Abu Zubeydah, one of Osama bin Laden's most senior lieutenants, was arrested in 2002 in Faisalabad in the house of a local representative of Lashkar e Taiba, Pakistan's most powerful Kashmiri jihad organization. Ramzi Binalshibh, who coordinated the 9/11 attacks, was arrested in Karachi in a safe house of Jaish e Muhammad, an even more violent Kashmiri organization, believed responsible for Daniel Pearl's kidnapping and execution.

This nexus is a strong as ever. After jihad-veteran Amjad Farooqi was killed by Pakistani police in September 2004, his deputy Matiur Rehman rose to become a senior al-Qaida leader. Still believed to be on the run (despite Western media reports), sources say Rehman personally oversaw not only the Pearl kidnapping, but also the multiple assassination attempts on President Musharraf from 2003 to 2006 (the latest in early July). He is at the helm of a vast, stealthy and extremely dangerous network, which still ferries volunteers to be trained in al-Qaida facilities in North and South Waziristan, and is actively plotting attacks against the West.

This "Pakistanization" of al-Qaida comes on top of strong indications that Osama bin Laden's organizations are enjoying the covert support of some extremely powerful, Islamic political parties and a few hundred of low-level "sympathizers" within the Pakistani military and intelligence establishments.

[aj1]

Candy, how would you break down the Pak population. What percentage are radical, what percentage are moderate, and so on?

Is there a divide among Pakistanis, about the fighting in Kashmir?

[candypreet]

Candy, how would you break down the Pak population. What percentage are radical, what percentage are moderate, and so on?

Is there a divide among Pakistanis, about the fighting in Kashmir?
difficult question. I have a friend whoose realtives stay in pakistan, he says his cousins wouldnt be bothered about kashmit, its all a political gimmick

[candypreet]

:) :add40:

[candypreet]

.................:add19: :add19: .....................

[candypreet]

The other war

January 13, 2007

Washington can't take its collective eye off Iraq, yet this week other areas competed for attention. Yesterday's harmless rocket attack on the American embassy in Athens was the least worrisome of the problems confronting the Bush administration, although it was a surprising reminder that the globe is rife with strife.

In his Wednesday address to the nation, President Bush made it clear that in his mind both Syria and Iran are dangerously close to inviting American military intervention. To those who suggest he should try diplomacy first, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice explained that's impossible because the United States would be a "supplicant" in any such approach. Horrors!

So the world waits for the next shoe to drop. Will the newly augmented carrier task force in the Persian Gulf spring into action to engage the Iranians who, the president tells us, are supplying the insurgents in Iraq? What is he prepared to do about Syria?

In the meantime, John Negroponte, the outgoing national director of intelligence, told a Senate committee that our presumed ally, Pakistan, must do more to control its tribal areas that, he said, are providing a haven for Islamist terrorists.

Pakistan's foreign and interior ministries angrily denied their country provides shelter to extremists and a Pakistani military spokesman said army forces had fired on vehicles carrying Islamic insurgents toward the Afghan border. Yet there was evidence yesterday that there continue to be strong connections between the terrorists in Afghanistan and at least some of the Pakistani people. The bodies of 24 insurgents killed in a clash with NATO and Afghan army forces were returned to Pakistan and Taliban leaders reportedly asked that they be given funerals as martyrs.

That request would appear to support claims by Afghans and Americans (and repeatedly denied by Pakistani officials) that Pakistan's tribal regions along the Afghan border provide a haven for Islamic militia groups seeking to destabilize the wobbly Western-backed government of Afghanistan.

Funeral preparations were said to be under way in villages in Pakistan's North Waziristan region where, last September, Pakistan accepted a truce they said would end extremist activities in the area. However, Afghan and NATO officials say cross-border infiltration by the extremists has in fact increased since the truce.

President Pervez Musharraf has repeatedly said he's cooperating with the United States and as proof he has pointed out that Pakistan has detained or killed a number of foreign militants linked to Al Qaeda. His government has also emphasized it has lost more than 700 troops fighting in remote tribal areas where no government, civilian or military, has ever gained effective control.

Part of the problem, of course, is that many Pakistanis are sympathetic to the Taliban and deeply distrust and even despise Musharraf, especially for his willingness to work with the United States in the "war on terror." So he's caught in the middle: Many of his own people won't support him and Washington says he's not doing enough. How does he hold on to his domestic support while also pleasing the White House? It isn't easy.

Negroponte's public admonishment can only further strain relations between Pakistan and Washington. Assuming Pakistan does need to improve its performance, shouldn't that message be sent through customary diplomatic channels? As in the case with Iran and Syria, diplomacy has been shunted aside by the Bush administration. This has become standard operating procedure for this crowd in Washington and apparently it will be at least two more years before there's any real hope of improvement.

http://www.timesargus.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20070113/OPINION01/701130308/1021/OPINION01

[Bman]

New Statesman

April 30, 2007

Pakistan: The Taliban takeover

Ziauddin Sardar



Pakistan is reverberating with the call of jihad. Taliban-style militias are spreading rapidly out from provinces in the far north-west. The danger to the country and to the rest of the world is escalating


"You must understand," says Maulana Sami ul-Haq, "that Pakistan and Islam are synonymous." The principal of Darul Uloom Haqqania, a seminary in Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), is a tall and jovial man. He grabs my hand as he takes me round the seminary. Maulana ul-Haq laughs when I ask his views on jihad. "It is the duty of all Muslims to support those groups fighting against oppression," he says.

The Haqqania is one of the largest madrasas in Pakistan. It produces about 3,000 graduates, most from exceptionally poor backgrounds, every year. The walls of the student dormitory are decorated with tanks and Kalashnikovs. A group of students, all with black beards, white turbans and grey dresses, surrounds me. They are curious and extremely polite. We chat under the watchful eye of two officers from Pakistan's intelligence services. What would they do after they graduate, I ask. "Serve Islam," they reply in unison. "We will dedicate our lives to jihad."

Pakistan is reverberating with the call of jihad. For more than two months, the capital, Islamabad, has been held hostage by a group of burqa-clad women, armed with sticks and shouting: "Al-jihad, al-jihad." These female students belong to two madrasas attached to the Lal Masjid, a large mosque near one of the city's main supermarkets. I found the atmosphere around the masjid tense, with heavily armed police surrounding the building. Though the students were allowed to go in and out freely, no one else could enter the mosque. The women are demanding the imposition of sharia law and the instant abolition of all "dens of vice". Away from the masjid, Islamabad looked like a city under siege.

A new generation of militants is emerging in Pakistan. Although they are generally referred to as "Taliban", they are a recent phenomenon. The original Taliban, who ruled Afghanistan briefly during the 1990s, were Afghan fighters, a product of the Soviet invasion of their country. They were created and moulded by the Pakistani army, with the active support of the United States and Saudi money, and the deliberate use of madrasas to prop up religious leaders. Many Taliban leaders were educated at Haqqania by Maulana Sami ul-Haq. The new generation of militants are all Pakistani; they emerged after the US invasion of Afghanistan and represent a revolt against the government's support for the US. Mostly unemployed, not all of them are madrasa-educated. They are led by young mullahs who, unlike the original Taliban, are technology- and media-savvy, and are also influenced by various indigenous tribal nationalisms, honouring the tribal codes that govern social life in Pakistan's rural areas. "They are Taliban in the sense that they share the same ideology as the Taliban in Afghanistan," says Rahimullah Yusufzai, Peshawar-based columnist on the News. "But they are totally Pakistani, with a better understanding of how the world works." Their jihad is aimed not just at "infidels occupying Afghanistan", but also the "infidels" who are ruling and running Pakistan and maintaining the secular values of Pakistani society. "They aim at nothing less than to cleanse Pakistan and turn it into a pure Islamic state," says Rashed Rahman, executive editor of the Lahore-based Post newspaper.

The Pakistani Taliban now dominate the northern province of Waziristan, adjacent to Afghan istan. "They are de facto rulers of the province," says Yusufzai. Waziristan is a tribal area that has historically been ruled by the tribes themselves. Pakistan has followed the policy of British Raj in the region. The British allowed tribal leaders, known as maliks, semi-autonomous powers in exchange for loyalty to the crown. Pakistan gives them the same power but demands loyalty to the federal government. They have been sidelined by the Taliban, however. Pro-government maliks who resisted the onslaught of the Taliban have been brutally killed and had their bodies hung from poles as a lesson to others. The Taliban have declared Waziristan an "Islamic emirate" and are trying to establish a parallel administration, complete with sharia courts and tax system.

Taliban-type militias have also taken control of parts of the adjacent NWFP. In Peshawar, one of the most open and accessible areas of the province, one can feel the tension on the streets. There are hardly any women out in public. The city, which has suffered numerous suicide attacks, is crowded with intelligence officers. Within an hour of my arrival in Peshawar, I was approached by a secret service official who warned that I was being watched. It is practically impossible for outsiders to enter other NWFP towns such as Tank, Darra Adam Khel and Dera Ismail Khan. In Dera Ismail Khan, outsiders - that is, Pakistanis from other parts of the country - need police escorts to travel around. You are allowed in only if you can prove you have business or relatives there. Girls' schools have been closed, video and music shops bombed, and barbers forbidden from shaving beards. The religious parties have passed a public morality law that gives them powers to prosecute anyone who does not follow their strict moral code. Legislation to ban dance and music is being planned. Even administration of polio vaccination campaigns has been halted amid claims that it is a US plot to sterilise future generations.

Why is the ostensibly secular government of President Pervez Musharraf not taking any action against the Taliban militants and the parties that support them? Part of the answer lies in the militants and religious parties having served the military regime well. After coming to power in 1999, Musharraf used them to neutralise the mainstream political parties - Benazir Bhutto's People's Party and the Muslim League, led by Nawaz Sharif. "The military and mullahs have been traditional allies," says the Islamabad-based security analyst Dr Ayesha Siddiqa. "The alliance of religious parties that rules NWFP came into power through his support." Musharraf also used the religious militants to destabilise Indian-held Kashmir by proxy. He encouraged extremists preaching jihad to infiltrate India for acts of sabotage.

The same is true of the Taliban. The Afghan Taliban have been a useful ally against unfriendly governments in Kabul. Even though Musharraf has been forced to go against them under pressure from the Americans, his strategy has been to try to contain them, rather than defeat them. He tried to regulate the madrasas in NWFP and elsewhere in Pakistan that provide recruits for the Taliban, seized their funds and banned them from admitting foreign students. But that's about as far as he wanted to go. Constant US pressure has forced him to send in the army, with grave consequences. Every time the Pakistani army enters Waziristan, it takes heavy casualties. Since 2003, when Pakistani troops first entered the tribal regions, more than 700 soldiers have been killed. Not surprisingly, Musharraf signed a hasty peace agreement on 5 September 2006 allowing the Afghan Taliban to get on with their business. "The military regards the Taliban as an asset," says Siddiqa. "So why destroy an asset? Particularly when the asset could be useful in the future."

That future may not be too far off. Pakistan's foreign policy towards Afghanistan is based on the assumption that the Nato forces there will withdraw sooner rather than later, leaving Hamid Karzai's regime to fend for itself. The Karzai government is strongly anti-Pakistani. But the Pakistani army needs friendly rulers in Kabul who would be willing to run the oil and gas pipelines that will serve the newly established port at Gwadar through Afghanistan's provinces (see page 32). So Pakistan needs the Afghan Taliban to exist as a force strong enough to establish the next government in Afghanistan.

Moreover, a pro-Islamabad Taliban-type government in Afghanistan would help establish peace in the northern tribal regions of Pakistan. Although Karzai himself is a Pashtun, most of the people in power in Kabul are Tajiks, a minority tribe. A sizeable majority of Afghans belong to the Pashtun ethnic group, which ruled Afghanistan for centuries. The position of Pakistan's military is that this imbalance "against the political history and tribal culture of Afghan istan", as one army officer told me, is not going to last. Most of the Pakistani Taliban - that is, the vast majority of people in Waziristan - are also Pashtun. And they will not rest until their brothers across the border hold the reins of power. As such, peace in this part of Pakistan depends on who rules Afghanistan.

Musharraf's strategy is to contain the Taliban of Afghan and Pakistani varieties alike, while weeding out al-Qaeda jihadis, or "foreign elements", as they are known in Pakistani military circles. The foreigners are a legacy of the Soviet-Afghan war. When the war ended, many of the central Asians who came to fight the Soviets were not welcomed back in their countries. For want of an alternative, they settled in Pakistan. Most of these foreign jihadis are Uzbek. Musharraf has simply bribed the local tribes to attack and eradicate the Uzbek jihadis. The battle between Pashtun tribesmen and al-Qaeda in Wana, southern Waziristan, in which more than 200 al-Qaeda fighters and some 50 tribal fighters were killed a fortnight ago was a product of this policy.

Musharraf's problem is that the Taliban cannot be contained. The Pakistani Taliban have now acquired enough confidence to break out of Wazi ristan and NWFP into other parts of the country. "What's happening at the Lal Masjid in Islamabad is a trial run for the rest of the country," says Rahman. "If the Taliban succeed in Islamabad, they will turn Pakistan into Talibistan."

Lawyers in uproar

While Musharraf continues to placate the Taliban, the rest of Pakistan is standing up against Talibanisation. Huge demonstrations have been held in Lahore, Karachi and other cities throughout Pakistan. To begin with, the protests were held to support Chief Justice Iftikhar Moham med Chaudhry, who was sacked by Musharraf in March. Chaudhry, who has become a national hero, tried to prevent the army from selling the national steel mill for a song. The affair was the latest in a long list of scandals involving the military. The openly unconstitutional act caused uproar, leading to countrywide protests by lawyers. But the lawyers have now acquired a broader agenda. They have become a national resistance movement, supported by all sections of society, against military rule and the Taliban.

Musharraf's response to the demonstrations and the Taliban challenge is to try to entrench himself even more deeply. While the country buckles under the pressure of suicide bombings, kidnappings and acts of sabotage, his main concern is his own survival. Constitutionally, he must hold elections some time this year - something he has promised to do, but the whole exercise will be designed to ensure that he continues as president for another five years.

His plan to get "re-elected" has two strands. The simple option is to get the current hand-picked parliament to endorse him for a second term and try to manipulate this vote, which the present sham constitution dictates, to ensure a healthy two-thirds majority. The heads of intelligence, the security services and the police have already been primed to ensure "positive results".

Bhutto to the rescue?

The other option is a bit messy. It involves making a deal with the former prime minister Benazir Bhutto, head of the Pakistan People's Party. Bhutto, who has been ousted from power by the military twice, is desperate to get back into power. She has a great deal in common with the general. She runs the People's Party as her personal property, and her social and economic policies - rooted as they are in feudalism and opportunism - are not far removed from those of the army. Her foreign policy would be the same as that of Musharraf; indeed, she is even more pro-American than the general.

So Bhutto and Musharraf, who have been negotiating with each other for almost three years, are an ideal couple. "The problem," says Rahman, "is that Musharraf does not want to give up his military uniform. It is the source of his strength. And the idea of Musharraf remaining military chief is anathema to Bhutto."

But the state of the nation, on the verge of political and religious collapse, may force Musharraf's hand. A deal between the general and the self-proclaimed "Daughter of the East" in which Musharraf retains most of his power as civilian president and Bhutto serves as prime minister may be acceptable to both. Rumours abound in Islamabad that a deal is imminent.

Bhutto's return from the cold would do little to stop Pakistan's slide into anarchy, however. The Taliban sense victory and will not be easily satisfied with anything less than a Pakistan under sharia law, or wide-ranging bloodshed. As Asma Jahangir, chairwoman of Pakistan's Human Rights Commission, makes clear, the country cannot survive its "deep-seated rot" unless the "unrepresentative organs of the state - the military, the mullahs and the all-consuming intelligence agencies - are brought under control". It is hard to disagree with her assessment. But it is even harder to see how these "unrepresen tative organs" can be stopped from dragging Pakistan further towards the abyss - with dire consequences for the rest of the world.

Pakistan: a short history

1947 Muslim state of Pakistan created by partition of India at the end of British rule

1948 First war with India over disputed territory of Kashmir

1965 Second war with India over Kashmir

1971 East Pakistan attempts to secede, triggering civil war. Third war between Pakistan and India. East Pakistan breaks away to become Bangladesh

1980 US pledges military assistance following Soviet intervention in Afghanistan

1988 Benazir Bhutto elected prime minister

1996 Bhutto dismissed, for the second time, on charges of corruption

1998 Country conducts nuclear tests

1999 General Pervez Musharraf seizes power in military coup

2001 Musharraf backs US in war on terror and supports invasion of Afghanistan

2002 Musharraf given another five years in office in criticised referendum

2003 Pakistan declares latest Kashmir ceasefire. India does likewise

2004 Musharraf stays head of army, having promised in 2003 to relinquish role

2005 Earthquake in Pakistan-administered Kashmir kills tens of thousands of people

2007 Musharraf suspends Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammed Chaudhry, triggering nationwide protests

[spotdogg]

The Truth About Talibanistan
Thursday, Mar. 22, 2007 By ARYN BAKER / KABUL, AFGHANISTAN Enlarge Photo
Afghan Border Police officers patrol near the Pakistani border in Gurbuz district
Balazs Gardi for TIMEArticle ToolsPrintEmailReprints The residents of Dara Adam Khel, a gunsmiths' village 30 miles south of Peshawar, Pakistan, awoke one morning last month to find their streets littered with pamphlets demanding that they observe Islamic law. Women were instructed to wear all-enveloping burqas and men to grow their beards. Music and television were banned. Then the jihadists really got serious. These days, dawn is often accompanied by the wailing of women as another beheaded corpse is found by the side of the road, a note pinned to the chest claiming that the victim was a spy for either the Americans or the Pakistani government. Beheadings are recorded and sold on DVD in the area's bazaars. "It's the knife that terrifies me," says Hafizullah, 40, a local arms smith. "Before they kill you, they sharpen the knife in front of you. They are worse than butchers."

Stories like these are being repeated across the tribal region of Pakistan, a rugged no-man's-land that forms the country's border with Afghanistan--and that is rapidly becoming home base for a new generation of potential terrorists. Fueled by zealotry and hardened by war, young religious extremists have overrun scores of towns and villages in the border areas, with the intention of imposing their strict interpretation of Islam on a population unable to fight back. Like the Taliban in the late 1990s in Afghanistan, the jihadists are believed to be providing leaders of al-Qaeda with the protection they need to regroup and train new operatives. U.S. intelligence officials think that Osama bin Laden and his deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, may have found refuge in these environs. And though 49,000 U.S. and NATO troops are stationed just across the border in Afghanistan, they aren't authorized to operate on the Pakistani side. Remote, tribal and deeply conservative, the border region is less a part of either country than a world unto itself, a lawless frontier so beyond the control of the West and its allies that it has earned a name of its own: Talibanistan.

Since Sept. 11, the strategic hinge in the U.S.'s campaign against al-Qaeda has been Pakistan, handmaiden to the Taliban movement that turned Afghanistan into a sanctuary for bin Laden and his lieutenants. While members of Pakistan's intelligence services have long been suspected of being in league with the Taliban, the Bush Administration has consistently praised Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf for his cooperation in rooting out and apprehending members of bin Laden's network. But the Talibanization of the borderlands--and their role in arming and financing insurgents in Afghanistan--has renewed doubts about whether Musharraf still possesses the will to face down the jihadists.

Those doubts are surfacing at a time when Musharraf confronts his biggest political crisis since grabbing power eight years ago. Since March 12, Pakistani streets have been the scene of clashes between police and thousands of lawyers and opposition activists outraged by Musharraf's decision to suspend the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry, for alleged abuse of office. Musharraf's critics say the President is attempting to rig the system to ensure he stays in power. Their ire boiled over when Pakistani police raided a television station to prevent it from covering protests outside the Supreme Court. Some Pakistanis who have excused Musharraf's authoritarianism in the past now portray him as a jackbooted dictator. "I think he has ruined himself," says retired Lieut. General Hamid Gul, former director general of the Pakistani intelligence organization Inter-Services Intelligence. "He's not going to be able to placate the forces he has unleashed."

Because Musharraf also heads Pakistan's army, it's unlikely that he will be forced from office. But a loss of support from his moderate base could deepen his dependence on fundamentalist parties, which are staunch supporters of the Taliban. If the protests against Musharraf continue, he will be even less inclined to crack down on the militants holding sway in Talibanistan--grim news for the U.S. and its allies and good news for their foes throughout the region. Says a senior U.S. military official in Afghanistan: "The bottom line is that the Taliban can do what they want in the tribal areas because the [Pakistani] army is not going to come after them."

In fact, the territory at the heart of Talibanistan--a heavily forested band of mountains that is officially called North and South Waziristan--has never fully submitted to the rule of any country. The colonial British were unable to conquer the region's Pashtun tribes and allowed them to run their own affairs according to local custom. In exchange, the tribesmen protected the subcontinental empire from northern invaders. Following independence in 1947, Pakistan continued the arrangement.

After 9/11, Islamabad initially left the tribal areas alone. But when it became obvious that al-Qaeda and Taliban militants were crossing the border to escape U.S. forces in Afghanistan, Pakistan sent in the first of what eventually became 80,000 troops. They had some success: the Pakistani army captured terrorist leaders and destroyed training camps. But the harder the military pressed, the more locals resented its presence, especially when civilians were killed in botched raids against terrorists.

As part of peace accords signed last September with tribal leaders in North Waziristan, the Pakistani military agreed to take down roadblocks, stop patrols and return to their barracks. In exchange, local militants promised not to attack troops and to end cross-border raids into Afghanistan. The accords came in part because the Pakistani army was simply unable to tame the region. Over the past two years, it has lost more than 700 troops there. The change in tactics, says Gul, was an admission that the Pakistani military had "lost the game."

The army isn't the only one paying the price now. Since Pakistani forces scaled back operations in the border region, the insurgency in Afghanistan has intensified. Cross-border raids and suicide bombings aimed at U.S. and NATO troops in Afghanistan have tripled, according to the senior U.S. military official. He concedes that "the Pakistanis are in a very difficult position. You could put 50,000 men on that border, and you wouldn't be able to seal it."

Continued at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1601850,00.html

[candypreet]

D-Company joins hand with LeT, poses threat to India

Zeenews Bureau

Mumbai, March 28: The intelligence agencies on Friday claimed to have gathered credible evidence to suggest that the Pakistan-based underworld don Dawood Ibrahim’s notorious D-Company has become a part of Lashkar-e-Toiba`s terror network.

D-Company supposedly has strong ties with ISI, which dates back to nineties. According to reports, Pakistan`s external intelligence agency employed Dawood’s network and his close associates to execute the March 12 serial bombings in Mumbai.

If the intelligence agencies are to be believed, Pakistan`s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) has been pressing Dawood to merge his gang with the terrorists outfit to boost its anti-India campaign.

The Indian intelligence agencies, which have been keeping a track of Pakistan’s ISI, have issued a fresh warning that the merger of the two deadly outfits poses a great threat to India.

"The underworld gang and the Lashkar jihadis have been knocked into a single entity and this has serious implications for India`s internal security," a senior intelligence official said on the condition of anonymity.

The reports come just a day after National Security Advisor M K Narayanan said that Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) is still supporting terrorist outfits like Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar-e-Toiba to launch attacks against India.

"We have seen no change in ISI`s attitude to mentor terror groups like Lashkar and Jaish... attacks on India from Pakistan`s soil are likely to continue," said National Security Advisor M K Narayanan, while delivering the 25th Air Chief Marshal P C Lal Memorial Lecture on Wednesday.

Further investigations by the Indian authorities into the Mumbai serial blast confirmed the presence of Dawood, Chhota Shakeel and Tiger Memon in Pakistan.

Shortly after the Mumbai serial blasts, Dawood along with his close associates including Chhota Shakeel and Tiger Memon – the main accused – fled to Pakistan.

Since then, Dawood has been operating its vast network under the umbrella protection of Pakistan’s ISI, which has time and again refuted India’s claim about the former’s presence in the neighbouring state.

However, the pressure increased on Islamabad and Dawood was branded as a global terrorist after the 9/11 attacks in the US, when the White House began its global war against terrorism.
http://www.zeenews.com/articles.asp?aid=433052&sid=NAT

[candypreet]

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/World/US_goes_for_the_jugular_in_Pakistan/articleshow/2951475.cms