Jemaah Islamiyah

[Petronas]

TERRORISM: 5 YEARS AFTER 9/11, JEMAAH ISLAMIYAH STILL A SERIOUS THREAT
Sep-08-06 14:59

Five years after the 9/11 attacks in the US and the start of the global war on terror, the Southeast Asian terrorist group, Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), which aims to create an Islamic caliphate in the region, has been weakened but remains a serious threat. "The group is much more fragmented," Sidney Jones, Southeast Asia director for the International Crisis Group told Adnkronos International (AKI). "But it is important to remember that part of JI is still intact and it is trying to regroup," said Jones. "The group is very adaptable and it still is a very serious threat," she added.

"Within JI there are tensions among those who want to carry on with indiscriminate attacks and those who do not," said Jones. The expert on terrorism in the Southeast Asian region cited the example of Malaysian Mohamed Noordin Top, a JI leader and the region's most wanted fugitive who favours indiscriminate attacks and appears to have lost the support of other members in the group.

According to Jones, one of the turning points in the fight against the al-Qaeda-linked JI has been the intervention of the United States in Southeast Asia, the region that has now been defined as the "second front in the war on terrorism".

Washington's main objective in the region has been the Filipino group, Abu Sayyaf, in the Sulu archipelago where American troops were deployed five months after the attacks on the World Trade Centre and soon after the fall of the hardline Taliban regime in Afghanistan in November 2001. Even if the American troops are not involved in combat operations, their continued support has been important for the Philippines, often considered the weak-link in the fight against terrorism in the region. Since then, the United States, assisted by Australia, has concentrated their attention on Jemaah Islamiyah, and signed various accords with countries in the region and contributed finances to their anti-terrorism forces.

Ken Conboy, the author of "The Second Front: Inside Asia’s Most Dangerous Terrorist Network", a book that traces the history of JI, told AKI about the other important changes inside JI in the past five years. "After 9/11 the main changes took place in Singapore and Malaysia where before JI members could hold normal jobs, and donate portions of their salaries to the organization," said Conboy. "After 11 September, they became fugitives in those nations. At the very least, they could no longer hold regular jobs and earn incomes. JI became much more dependent on al-Qaeda for funding," he added.

Sources say that in the past, al-Qaeda passed 130,000 dollars to JI. The link between the two organisations was Riduan Isamuddin, alias Hambali, who was arrested in Thailand in 2003. According to experts, today JI is financed mainly by the donations from members and from petty crime.

Besides Hambali's arrest, Conboy identified the September 2002 attacks on Bali and the death of Malaysian bomb-maker, Azahari bin Husin, in November 2005, as among the key episodes in the efforts against JI. "After that date (the 2002 Bali bombings), the authorities moved swiftly, arresting hundreds. Over the ensuing year, the top three layers of JI were effectively eliminated," he said.

As for the Azahari's death, Conboy said that it contributed to a change in tactics by the JI, which for the moment, appears to have abandoned large-scale attacks in favour of smaller bombs that require little technical know-how and money. "Yet they are just as effective in inflicting casualties to expatriates," said Conboy referring to the three explosions that killed 22 people to Bali on 1 October 2005. "The threat is far from over," he concluded.

http://www.adnki.com/index_2Level_English.php?cat=Terrorism&loid=8.0.338127615&par=0

[Petronas]

Supergrass = informer in British slang

The jihadi who turned 'supergrass'
Wednesday, 13 September 2006, 01:13 GMT 02:13 UK

In the fight against the international terrorist threat in Indonesia, one man has become an invaluable ally. Nasir Abbas explains why, after men he trained carried out the Bali bombing in 2002, he decided to change sides. For many years Nasir Abbas was one of the most wanted jihadis in South East Asia. He was a member of al-Qaeda's regional affiliate, Jemaah Islamiya (JI).

The Malaysian trained the Bali bombers in Afghanistan, established a jihadi training camp - Camp Hudabiya - in the dense jungles of Mindanao in the southern Philippines, and rose to become the head of JI's military training division, known as Mantiki Three. He was close to some of the most notorious militants in the region and brother-in-law of Mukhlas, the mastermind of the 2002 Bali bombings. Those he trained and those he knew went on to operate not just in South East Asia, but in other parts of the world.

Mr Abbas seems an unlikely jihadi. He is quietly spoken, well-mannered and seemingly gentle, belying the fearsome reputation acquired over the years.

I asked Indonesia's top anti-terrorist police officer, General Ansyaad Mbai, how he used to regard his adversary. "He was a very dangerous man because he was one of the key figures in JI," he said.

Mr Abbas makes no secret of what he taught at Camp Hudabiya, which evolved from a clearing in the jungle to become, in his words, a fully-fledged military academy. "It included individual combat training, small arms and weapons training and basic knowledge about explosives," he said.

Did he train people to kill? His reply gave a hint of why he eventually underwent such a remarkable transformation. "I train people for war, for battle," he said. "We are killing for defence. We are fighting for our right. And we are not attacking civilians but soldiers."

According to Mr Abbas' philosophy of jihad, it is acceptable to fight and kill foreign forces occupying Muslim countries like the Soviets in Afghanistan, the Americans in Iraq or the Philippine army occupying ancestral Muslim lands in Mindanao, but killing innocent civilians - men, women and children - is forbidden. This is the philosophy of modern violent jihad outlined by Palestinian Abdullah Azzam, acknowledged to be the "father" of modern violent jihad.

With this distinction in mind, the 2002 Bali bombings in which 202 civilians died, made Mr Abbas think again about the organisation to which he had belonged for almost a decade. When he discovered that his former students, whom he had trained in Afghanistan in the early 1990s, were responsible, he was deeply shocked. "I feel sorry, I feel sin," he said, "because they used the knowledge to kill civilians, to kill innocent people."

It was only when he was arrested six months later in April 2003, that Mr Abbas finally decided to put his past behind him. As he was taken off for interrogation, he feared the worst. "I believed that the police were very cruel and used torture to get their answers," he said. His ultimate test of allegiance came when he gave evidence in court against the spiritual leader of Jemaah Islamiya

But Mr Abbas was in for a surprise. He was treated with civility and Muslim respect. He was also surprised that so much was known about him and was puzzled as to how his interrogators knew. He was arrested one evening and kept silent until the following morning. Then he decided to talk and help the police, because he thought it was God's will. He said he felt "responsible, in front of God, to stop all these bad deeds."

From that point on, Mr Abbas tried to persuade his former comrades that their interpretation of the Koran was wrong. He urges them to "return to the right path of Islamic teaching." But he did much more than that. He actively assisted the police in tracking down and arresting some of his former comrades and felt no guilt in doing so.

His ultimate test of allegiance came almost two years after his arrest when he gave evidence in court against the alleged spiritual leader of JI, Abu Bakar Ba'asyir. Mr Ba'asyir was charged with conspiracy in connection with the 2002 Bali bombing. There was a near riot in court when Mr Abbas gave evidence that Ba'asyir had personally made him the leader of Mantiki Three and had attended a passing out parade of Mr Abbas' graduates at Camp Hudabiya. Ba'asyir was given a two-and-half year prison sentence.

Mr Abbas continues his work today. Last week another JI member against whom he gave evidence, Mohamed Cholily, was sentenced to 18 years for involvement in the 2005 Bali bombing. And earlier this year he provided police with information that helped them track down Azahari Bin Husin, JI's master bomb maker, who made the 2002 Bali bombs.

The jihadi who turned has every intention of carrying on. The problem for the police is keeping him alive as he has made so many enemies. JI's Noordin Top, now the most wanted man in Indonesia, has made no secret of what he would do to Mr Abbas should he ever get his hands on him. Mr Abbas believes God will protect him.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/5334594.stm

[Petronas]

Jemaah Islamiya Enters Regrouping Phase
Volume 3, Issue 45 (November 21, 2006)

In response to President George W. Bush's November visit to Indonesia, there have been demonstrations by Islamist parties and organizations, as well as increased terrorism threat warnings (Jakarta Post, November 19, 20). Indonesian security officials have braced themselves for an attack for several months now. Jemaah Islamiya (JI) has executed a major terrorist attack every year since 2002; each attack has occurred approximately 10-13 months after the previous one. The last attack was the October 2005 triple bombings in Bali that killed 22. The Bali II attacks did not consist of JI's hallmark large truck bombs, but involved small bag bombs similar to the terrorist operations in Madrid and London. The smaller bombs may represent diminished resources, but they also could be assessed as both a counter-measure and as an attempt to increase the tempo of the attacks. When JI's top bomb-maker, Dr. Azahari bin Husin, was killed in a shootout in November 2005, 33 smaller bombs in various states of construction were recovered in his safe house. In addition to killing the most notorious bomber, authorities were able to seize the bulk of JI's explosive cache. In 2006, there were raids on several other safe houses that netted a few more bombs. On October 3, a woman smuggling nine kilograms of plastic explosives was arrested. The losses of Azahari, the cache and the dragnet for top operatives including Noordin Mohammad Top and Zulkarnaen, have clearly set back JI's operations. If JI is weakened operationally, what is the state of its organization?

Several commentators now speak of irrevocable factional rifts in JI between the pro-al-Qaeda camp that favors collapsing the state by damaging the economy, and the proponents of the neo-Darul Islam schools that argue that JI should focus on sectarian conflict and aim to establish an Islamic state in Indonesia (Reuters, November 11). Evidence of this has been documented on web forums and in chat rooms. This rift, however, is overstated for three reasons. First, Hambali, and others equated as being the leaders of the pro-al-Qaeda line, threw themselves into fomenting sectarian conflict in 1998-2001 and saw such conflicts as essential to their goal. Second, they are not mutually exclusive strategies. Indeed, many of the operatives tied to the JW Marriott and Australian Embassy bombings were arrested as a result of investigations into the ongoing sectarian violence in the Malukus and in Central Sulawesi. Sectarian violence is an important recruiting and indoctrinating tool for JI. Third, too much attention is given to recent statements by Abu Bakar Ba'asyir (also known as Abu Bakar Bashir), who is now publicly denouncing jihad.

In a sermon in a mosque in Kediri, an East Java province, Ba'asyir urged his followers to go abroad to wage jihad, although without explaining why. "If you want to go on jihad, do not do it here [Indonesia], but in the southern Philippines or even in Iraq" (Antara News, November 6). He reiterated a statement that he had said in the past: the Bali bombers were legitimate jihadis, but their jihad was "not at the right time or place." He concluded by saying, "Therefore, I ask MMI [Mujahideen Congress of Indonesia] followers not to imitate them because [their actions] are harmful. They miscalculated." Ba'asyir has espoused a program of dawah (preaching Islam) to achieve his goal of establishing an Islamic state. Ba'asyir did not condemn the actions of the Bali bombers on moral or theological grounds, but on timing. Likewise, he is endorsing violent jihad in places other than Indonesia. Second, he has never used his authority to stop the annual bombings. Ba'asyir is trying to keep himself out of prison. This was a large public sermon and little is known about what he may be saying in private. Although he was released in June, Indonesia had been under diplomatic pressure for an earlier release and other remissions of JI members. The strategies are not mutually exclusive; indeed, they are mutually reinforcing as they are not theological or ideological condemnations, but more tactical shifts. The al-Qaeda strategy was counter-productive because it led to mass arrests, including of top leaders, and placed undue international attention and pressure on the Indonesian government to crack down.

What is occurring now is less zero-sum factional rifts than breakdowns in the organization's command and control. JI always encouraged members to establish their own cells as well as organizations with varying degrees of overtones. With the arrest of much of the Mantiqi structure, JI has become a far more horizontal organization with much less command and control. Individual wakalahs and cells are more autonomous than they have ever been. Therefore, what may appear as irrevocable factional rifts could simply be organizational disunity because of counter-terrorist operations.

Within JI, there is a feeling that the annual bombings of soft Western targets, while still being conducted as part of the jihad, have been counter-productive because they have led to harsh crackdowns and arrests of key members. This marks a tactical shift and not a strategic one. What should we expect from JI in the coming years? There will still be terrorist attacks against Western targets and probably more in the Philippines, but they will be smaller and less effective (Sun Star, November 13). JI is in a regrouping phase, and to that end it will focus on recruitment and indoctrination, fomenting sectarian violence and broadening its network of overt civil society and social welfare organizations.

http://jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2370215

[Petronas]

Cambodia's top court upholds life sentences for Islamic militants
Wed Mar 12, 3:14 AM ET

Cambodia's Supreme Court on Wednesday upheld life sentences for three Muslims convicted of plotting terror attacks against the British embassy and a UN agency in the capital Phnom Penh.

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Cambodian Sman Ismael and Thais Abdul Azi Haji Chiming and Muhammad Yalaludin Mading were sentenced in 2004 to life in prison by the Phnom Penh Municipal Court for plotting attacks here between 2002 and 2003.

Despite persistent criticism of the prosecutions from rights groups, a five-judge panel ruled that evidence proved the three had helped Islamic militant Hambali, an alleged key member of the Al-Qaeda-linked Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) network, to plan the strikes.

Hambali, whose real name is Riduan Isamuddin, reportedly spent several months in Cambodia before being captured in Thailand in 2003. He was later handed over to US authorities and is now being held at the US military base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

"There is enough evidence to prove that the three men facilitated Hambali's group in preparing terror attacks," said judge Khim Ponn, adding that the group had intended to strike the British embassy and the UN children's agency UNICEF.

Hambali, an Egyptian and a Malaysian were tried in absentia in Cambodia and sentenced to life in prison in 2004 for their roles in the planned attacks, which Khim Ponn said were intended "to cause the loss of many lives."

All three imprisoned men have repeatedly denied the charges against them, with Sman Ismael saying after Wednesday's hearing that the court only used "evidence written on a piece of paper by the United States" to find him guilty.

"I am not a terrorist. I had no plan to kill people," he added.

The trio's lawyer, Kao Soupha, told AFP that there were no witnesses to prove that his clients were conspiring with international extremists, adding that the court's decision was "unacceptable."

Speaking in Thailand, the wives of the two Thai men protested the decision, accusing the court of trying to curry favour with the Americans.

"Our husbands went to Cambodia to work as religious teachers, hoping that they could earn more money than in Thailand," said Asisa Haji Chiming, 33, who has three children with husband Abdul.

"But they were accused of being terrorists and planning to stage attacks," Asisa told AFP in Yala province in the Muslim-majority south of Thailand.

"We have closely monitored the case for five years with high hopes that they would receive justice and be freed, but we think the Supreme Court has delivered a verdict just to please the US."

Asisa and Muhammad's wife, Parida, 42, said they plan to petition to have their husbands moved to Thailand to serve their sentences, so they can ask for a royal pardon for the two men.

JI has been blamed for the October 2002 bombings in the Indonesian resort of Bali that killed 202 people.

Washington has lauded Cambodia for its role in the US "war on terror," with the country's leaders earning praise from top American police and military officials seeking better co-operation with Cambodia's government on anti-terror efforts.

http://news.yahoo.com:80/s/afp/20080312/wl_asia_afp/cambodiaattacksji